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ABSTRACT
Increasing numbers of economists and policymakers consider that
reindustrialisation is a key factor in enhancing economic growth
and a better standard of living in post-crisis Europe. Therefore, a
new European Union industrial policy focuses on increasing man-
ufacturing share in gross domestic product (G.D.P.). The assump-
tion of recently developed theoretical models states that
development of the financial sector is essential for economic
growth and therefore for the growth of the manufacturing indus-
try. The aim of this research is to examine the importance of the
financial conditions in the process of industrialisation in Central
and Eastern European countries. The results of a macro panel
model that examines which factors influence the manufacturing
value added as a percentage of G.D.P. suggest that the role of
the financial sector is very important for the level of industrialisa-
tion in the analysed countries. The research is based on data col-
lected from the World Development Indicators database
published by the World Bank for the period from 2005 to 2015.
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Deindustrialisation is usually defined as an absolute or relative decrease of employ-
ment in industry, or as a decrease in the share of industry in gross domestic product
(G.D.P.). Today, the term deindustrialisation mainly refers to the experience of the
advanced economies of the world. Most of these economies have been deindustrialis-
ing from the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. This trend was
particularly obvious in the employment share of manufacturing. Employment dein-
dustrialisation was associated with the loss of good jobs, rising inequality, and a
potential decline in innovation capacity (Rodrik, 2016). Clark (1940) proposed the
theory of a reversed U-shaped relationship between economic development and man-
ufacturing employment. He claimed that, as an economy develops, prices of agricul-
tural products and relative demand for them decreases, while manufacturing prices
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and relative demand for them increases. The result is an increase in manufacturing
employment. In the later stage of development, demand for manufacturing products
decreases. This shifts the employment from manufacturing to the service sector.
In terms of output, deindustrialisation has been less remarkable and uniform. This
pattern was obscured by the frequent reliance on value-added measures at current
rather than at constant prices. However, the trend of deindustrialisation has been
spread to developing countries and was more striking in low and middle-income
industries. According to Rodrik (2016), these countries have experienced premature
deindustrialisation. The author expects that premature deindustrialisation can have
potentially significant economic and political consequences, including lower economic
growth and democratic failure. Namely, in most of these countries manufacturing has
started to shrink at lower levels of income compared with the levels of income in
developed countries when the process of deindustrialisation started. Therefore, devel-
oping countries are becoming service economies without experiencing a whole pro-
cess of industrialisation.
Recently, literature trends have been based on examining the importance of reindus-
trialisation. The first wave of literature on reindustrialisation appeared in the 1980s in
Europe and the U.S.A. The reindustrialisation literature in Europe was focusing on the
creation of new innovative industries, activities and products, with high priority for the
environmental protection industry, and was associated with political changes in Central
and East Europe. These changes were associated with the crisis and decline of state-
owned industries, leading to some deindustrialisation. This subject became important
again after the latest economic crisis (Camarinha-Matos, 2013).
As mentioned above, before the 2008 crisis, the dominant opinion was that dein-
dustrialisation was a prerequisite for the successful economic development. However,
after the crisis, this opinion has been changed, and a much greater appreciation of
the importance of industry has become evident. Increasing numbers of economists
and policymakers consider that reindustrialisation is a key process for enhancing eco-
nomic growth and a better standard of living in post-crisis Europe. Therefore, a new
industrial policy in the European Union (E.U.) focuses on increasing manufacturing
share in G.D.P. This is particularly important for new E.U. member states from
Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, the decline of state-owned industry
had initiated a wide deindustrialisation process – the increasing role of services and
the relative marginalisation of industry. In this process, post-socialist states have been
transformed into service-dominated economies. Although the deindustrialisation pro-
cess has been stopped in a few Central and Eastern European countries (C.E.E.C.s),
such as the Czech Republic and Poland, in countries such as Croatia the deindustrial-
isation process has caused significant reallocation of resources from the industrial sec-
tor to the service sector. Due to this reallocation, the level of industrial production in
Croatia is at a lower level than before the transition.
In the last few decades, the process of financial liberalisation has changed the eco-
nomic structure worldwide. Even though the assumption of recently developed theor-
etical models implies that development of the financial sector is important for
economic growth, and therefore for the growth of the manufacturing industry
(Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2006), empirical evidence of the link between financial sector
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development and industrialisation is inconclusive. Some authors found strong support
for the growth-enhancing hypothesis, and some other found only weak or mixed evi-
dence of positive growth. Strong support for growth-enhancing financial liberalisation
was documented in the work of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), Quinn and
Toyoda (2008) and Gehringer (2013), while Rodrik (1998) and Edison, Levine, Ricci,
and Sløk (2002) found only a weak growth effect. In addition, the negative influence
of financial globalisation has been found in enhanced financial instability (Rodrik
1998; Stiglitz 2004) and increased volatility of industrial production (Levchenko,
Ranciere, & Thoenig, 2009). In C.E.E.C.s, reforming the banking sector was the first
crucial step towards financial development. In the transition process, from the 1990s,
foreign banks were allowed to enter the market, and within a decade they held a
majority share in most C.E.E.C.s’ banks. As a result, a heavily regulated industry
turned into a highly competitive one, stimulating economic growth to some extent
(Caporale, Rault, & Sova, 2009).
Due to the transition process in C.E.E.C.s, these countries have experienced the
process of deindustrialisation and financial development at the same time. However,
despite the widely recognised importance of financial sector development and rein-
dustrialisation on economic growth, little research has been conducted on the rela-
tionship between the financial sector and industrialisation. This is particularly true
when one considers this issue in C.E.E.C.s that, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been addressed in empirical literature. Our research seeks to fill this gap in the litera-
ture. Therefore, the aim of this research is to examine the role of the financial condi-
tions in the process of industrialisation in C.E.E.C.s (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia) for the period 2005–2015. The panel model is applied in order to examine
the importance of the financial sector in the process of deindustrialisation
in C.E.E.C.s.
The article is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of existing
literature on the relationship among analysed variables. The stylised facts and descrip-
tive statistics about industrialisation and variables of interest analysis in C.E.E.C.s are
presented in Section 3. Model specification and results are presented in Section 4.
Concluding remarks are in the last section of the article.
2. Empirical literature
In most previous empirical works, deindustrialisation was defined as decline of manu-
facturing employment in total employment. Clark (1940) attributed the shift of
employment from manufacturing to services to the normal structural change of all
economies on their development path. With economic development, as real income
per capita rises, the relative demand for agricultural products falls and relative
demand for manufacturing first rises, and then falls in favour of services. This occurs
as a consequence of the higher rate of relative productivity in the industrial sector
and of the systematic changes in consumption patterns in different development
stages. The theory was adopted by many economists who state that deindustrialisation
emerges with the higher rate of productivity growth in manufacturing relative to
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services, consequently lowering the employment growth in manufacturing relative to
services, even if output increases at the same rate (Rowthorn & Wells, 1987;
Krugman & Lawrence, 1993; Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997; Rowthorn & Coutts,
2004; Tregenna, 2011).
According to Rowthorn and Wells (1987) this is positive form of deindustrialisa-
tion. They argue that deindustrialisation can also occur as negative process, as result
of a structural disequilibrium in the economy that prevents a nation from reaching
its growth potential or employment of its resources. It is manifested in poor perform-
ance in the manufacturing sector, and is accompanied by a slowdown in manufactur-
ing output and productivity (Alderson, 1999). Finally, it will result in poor
performance of the economy in general, a decline in competitiveness and growth in
unemployment, since the labour shed is not absorbed by the service sector. Rowthorn
and Wells (1987) also identified ‘trade-related deindustrialisation’. They concluded
that nations that run a manufacturing trade surplus, ceteris paribus, will devote more
resources and labour to this sector than nations that run deficits.
Following Rowthorn’s earlier explanation of deindustrialisation as the consequence
of higher productivity growth in manufacturing and the reallocation of labour from
manufacturing to services, Palma (2005, 2014) adds that it results from a reduction in
income elasticity for manufacturers and a new international division of labour
(including ‘outsourcing’). He develops a new concept of the ‘Dutch disease’, pointing
to an additional form of deindustrialisation in cases where a country discovered sig-
nificant natural resources, developed export service activities, mainly finance or tour-
ism, or as a result of changes in economic policy. In addition, Palma (2014)
emphasises a case of ‘reverse’ reindustrialisation, a reduction in manufacturing
employment associated with a fall in income per capita, typical for countries of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Felipe, Mehta, and Rhee (2014) raise the question whether today’s developing
economies can achieve high-income status without first building large manufacturing
sectors, and how difficult it is to sustain high levels of manufacturing activity. They
found that practically every economy that enjoys a high income today experienced a
manufacturing employment share in excess of 18–20%, and that the maximum
expected employment share for a typical developing economy has fallen to around
13–15%. That is why the authors conclude that the path to prosperity through indus-
trialisation may have become more difficult.
Rodrik (2016) documents a significant deindustrialisation trend in recent deca-
des. He notices that countries are running out of industrialisation opportunities
sooner and at much lower levels of income compared with the experience of early
industrialisers. The author emphasises the differences between countries, and
underlines that Asian countries and manufacturing exporters have been largely
insulated from those trends, while Latin American countries have been especially
hard hit. The author finds that advanced economies have lost considerable
employment, but they have done very well in terms of manufacturing output
shares at constant prices. The evidence suggests that both globalisation and
labour-saving technological progress in manufacturing have been behind these
developments.
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On analysing the literature dealing with the importance of (re)industrialisation, it
can be concluded that it has been always actualised in crisis and post-crisis periods.
Industrial policies in C.E.E.C.s have had a pattern similar to the developed European
countries, which evolved from a vertical towards a horizontal and ‘fresh’ approach.
After the end of the Second World War, most governments in the U.S.A. and
Western Europe applied the Keynesian vertical approach. Active direct state support
was directed towards selected key industrial sectors and less developed regions to
stimulate post-war economic recovery and preserve employment in large firms. In the
late 1980s, with the creation of the E.U. Single Market, this ‘vertical’ industrial policy
lost favour as the Reagan–Thatcher economic policies emphasised the withdrawal of
the state from economic management, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, a
greater reliance on market forces and the creation of a business-friendly ‘investment
climate’ in which the spontaneous forces of the market would decide which industries
or sectors would prosper, and which would fall by the wayside (Bartlett, 2014). Under
the new pro-competition ‘horizontal’ approach to industrial policy, the role of the
government was to enable a growth-enhancing environment, ensuring the quality of
institutions which will create a competitive market. These new industrial policies
have been designed to support privatisation and small-to-medium enterprises
(S.M.E.s), develop technology parks and local industrial clusters, and promote the
transfer of knowledge from universities and research institutes to the business sector
(Bartlett, 2014). The recent global financial crises, and the shift of economic power to
new emerging economies in East Asia and the rise of the B.R.I.C. economies led by
China, stimulated the European Commission (E.C.) to rethink the E.U. industrial
development approach with the aim to increase its global competition. Consequently,
in 2010 the E.C. introduced a ‘fresh’ industrial policy. Although the horizontal
approach to industry policy is still relevant and its aim is to prevent unfair competi-
tion within the E.U., the Commission identified specific sectors for development at a
European level, such as space technology, clean and energy efficient motor vehicles,
transport equipment, healthcare, environmental goods, energy supply industries,
security industries, chemicals, engineering, transport equipment, agro-food and busi-
ness services (European Commission, 2010). The new industrial policy draws on the
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular Article 173 T.F.E.U. on industrial pol-
icy. As part of the Europe 2020 strategy the Commission will now regularly report on
the E.U.’s and Member States’ industrial policies, organised through the
Competitiveness Council and the European Parliament (Bartlett, 2014).
The deindustrialisation process in each particular country is the result of a mix of
positive and negative factors that have changed over time. Many socio-economic,
financial and institutional factors could promote or hinder the industrialisation pro-
cess. A country’s size, its natural resources, the skills of its people, the stability of its
government and institutions and their ability to implement the fiscal, monetary, and
exchange rate policies all influence sustainable industrial development. Research lit-
erature that clarifies the understanding of the role of the financial sector in the pro-
cess of de(re)industrialisation is scarce. The weaknesses of existing work could be
overcome if the literature on the connections between the financial sector and eco-
nomic growth is taken into consideration (e.g., King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997,
388 T. SVILOKOS ET AL.
2005; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). This literature has focused on the role of financial
intermediaries in facilitating exchange and providing liquidity (Bencivenga & Smith,
1991) and in diversifying risks (Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997). Recently, attention has
been paid to the impact of the financialisation process, financial liberalisation policies
and financial development on economic growth.
Svilokos and Burin (2017) highlight that although financial development is usually
perceived as a positive process with positive effects on economic growth (Bekaert
et al., 2005; Quinn & Toyoda, 2008; Gehringer, 2013), the real effects may be oppos-
ite. In the scientific literature financialisation has usually been proved to have nega-
tive effects on economic growth and development (Yeldan, 2000; Epstein, 2001;
Stockhammer, 2004; Palley, 2007; Freeman, 2010). The rise of the financial sector as a
dominant force in many developed economies over the last two decades has been
accompanied by widespread deindustrialisation, and has left these economies vulner-
able to destructive financial bubbles (Bellamy-Foster & Magdoff, 2009).
The roots of analysis of the impact of interest rate changes on the economy can be
found in the neoclassical growth framework (Jorgenson, Rational, & Patterns, 1967;
Jorgenson & Hall, 1971, McKinnon–Shaw complementarity hypothesis). According to
the neoclassical (or marginalist) approach, which is nowadays still dominant among
economists, the negative dependence of investment on the interest rate is necessary
for establishing a stable full-employment general equilibrium. Expected inflation rates
are an integral part of determining whether or not an interest rate impacts invest-
ment. The real interest rate represents a fundamental valuation of the influence
between inflation and nominal interest rates, and therefore is used in broader eco-
nomic analyses of consumption/saving and investment decisions. An increase in the
real interest rate creates an incentive to postpone consumption and increase saving,
which can negatively impact economic activity. It is argued that a reduction in inter-
est rates increases liquidity, lowers the cost of consumption and increases aggregate
demand. This demand expansion should lead to secondary effects such as accelerated
investment and employment growth, so inducing a multiplier process in the economy
(La Roux and Ismail, 2004). Conventional economic analysis suggests that lower
interest rates will directly increase investment spending by lowering the cost of cap-
ital, which should raise production capacity and thus potential future output growth.
The size of this effect depends on the financial conditions of firms and on economic
structures, such as the capital intensity of production (Peersman & Smets, 2002). The
European Commission (2009a, 2009b) conducted an analysis on a sample of 25 E.U.
countries, and the findings imply that real interest rates have a robust negative correl-
ation with manufacturing output growth.
Interest rate uncertainty has obvious effects on investment (Ingersoll & Ross, 1992;
Alvarez & Koskela, 2004; Alvarez, 2010). Unlike the traditional theory, some scholars
have concluded that there was a positive correlation between interest rate and invest-
ment. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) found out that real interest rates and
growth rates are positively related. They concluded that financial restrictions and let-
ting market forces determine real interest rates lead to higher real interest rates and
higher levels of savings, which in turn induce economic growth. Lanyi and Saracoglu
(1983) found positive correlation between investment and interest rate in an
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uncertain environment and Beccarini (2007) concluded that the higher volatility the
interest rate had, the more positive the correlation would be. There are also some
scholars who believe that the rates may have no impact on investment. Dore,
Makken, and Eastman (2013) found that investment depended on the level of
demand in the macroeconomic, rather than interest rates. Real interest rate could be
negative if inflation is higher than the interest rate. It could cause depreciation in the
exchange rate and investment reallocation to some other countries where govern-
ments are able to maintain inflation. The McKinnon–Shaw hypothesis (1973) states
that a low or negative real rate of interest discourages savings and hence reduces the
availability of loanable funds, constrains investment, and in turn lowers the rate of
economic growth.
Exchange rate fluctuations are important for industry, especially for exporting sec-
tors. There is a relatively large body of literature suggesting a correlation between the
real exchange rate and G.D.P. growth (Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger, 2002; Petreski
2009). Rodrik (2008) concluded that a weak real exchange rate could compensate for
institutional weaknesses and market failures which lead to underinvestment in the
traded goods sector in developing countries. Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) stated
that, in developing countries, favourable exchange rates help export sectors like man-
ufacturing to compete. Aizenman and Lee (2010), Benigno, Converse, and Fornaro
(2015) and McLeod and Mileva (2011) concluded that exchange rate undervaluation
acts like a subsidy to the tradable sector. Gl€uzmann, Levy-Yeyati, and Sturzenegger
(2012) find that undervaluation does not affect the tradable sector, but does lead to
higher savings, investment and employment through lower labour costs and income
redistribution in developing countries.
Di Nino, Eichengreen, and Sbracia (2011) and Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik
(2005) demonstrate that rapid growth accelerations are often correlated with real
exchange rate depreciations. Rodrik (2008) finds that the growth acceleration occurs,
on average, after 10 years of steady increase in undervaluation in developing coun-
tries. Habib, Mileva, and Stracca (2016) concluded that a real appreciation (depreci-
ation) significantly reduces (raises) the annual real G.D.P. growth, more than in
previous estimates in the literature. Their overall conclusion is that the exchange rates
do matter for growth in developing economies, but substantially less so in advanced
ones, which confirms and strengthens the conclusions of Rodrik (2008). Kappler,
Reisen, Schularick, and Turkisch (2012) find limited effect of 25 episodes of large
nominal and real appreciations on economic growth. Nouira and Sekkat (2012) find
no evidence that undervaluation promotes growth for developing countries, after
excluding overvaluation episodes. Although most empirical papers confirm a positive
relation between weak real exchange rates and growth, Dollar (1992) shows that over-
valuation harms growth, whereas Razin and Collins (1997) and Aguirre and Calderon
(2005) find that large (over)undervaluation hurts growth, while modest undervalu-
ation enhances growth. Rose (2014) emphasised that the exchange rate regime was
not an important determinant of growth during the global financial crisis.
Industrial export-oriented countries have access to large markets. Moreover, trade
liberalisation allows access to imported inputs, technology and capital as well as a
more competitive exchange rate which could boost industry growth. Jamison, Lau,
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and Wang (2003) point out that trade openness has a strong impact on economic
growth. Rodrik (1998) considers that trade openness increases the risk of fluctuations
in the output of the economy caused by fluctuations in trade conditions.
Foreign direct investment (F.D.I.) may initiate industrialisation through the provi-
sion of financial resources and links to export markets. F.D.I. may contribute to the
host country through technology and knowledge transfer, improved competition and
human capital, upgrading its technological, operational and managerial effectiveness.
In this way F.D.I. may trigger industrialisation in developing countries (Søreide,
2001). Many economists consider F.D.I. as an important contributor to the develop-
ment process of developing and emerging economies (Kudina & Pitelis, 2014).
Adopting new technologies has proved to be a precondition for industrial develop-
ment. Host countries free-ride on expensive research investment usually paid for by
multinational corporations. The welfare effects of F.D.I. are not necessarily beneficial.
Dependency theorists argue that F.D.I. in developing countries creates investment
dependence and delays development in these countries (Boswell & Dixon, 1990), and
that dependence on foreign capital impedes their development (Bornschier & Chase-
Dunn, 1985; London & Smith, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990). Although it is crucial
to acknowledge that dependency scholars have mainly focused on economic growth
and development, perhaps it is reasonable to expect that F.D.I. and long-term
dependence on foreign capital in developing countries negatively influence industrial-
isation. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) argue that while F.D.I. flows might
enhance economic growth in developing countries in the short run, the long-term
dependence on foreign capital, indicated by F.D.I. stock, hurts economic growth.
3. Some stylised facts and descriptive analysis
After the 2008 crisis, the E.C. set the target to increase the contribution of manufac-
turing to G.D.P. from 16% to 20% by 2020 in the European economy. The details of
common industrial policy are stated in the document named ‘Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions for a European Industrial
Renaissance’ (European Commission, 2014). This document points out the need for
modernisation and reindustrialisation of the E.U.’s industry through highly adaptive,
productive and technologically advanced industries.
Figure 1 shows average manufacturing value added share of G.D.P. for C.E.E.C.s.
It is evident that this share fell in all C.E.E.C.s in the period 2005–2008. The excep-
tions were Bulgaria and Poland. In Bulgaria the share was higher in 2008 compared
with that in 2005, and in Poland this share remained approximately the same. This
declining trend may be explained by the deindustrialisation process, in which these
countries have been transformed into service-oriented economies. In this period, the
industry share in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia
accounted for more than 20% of G.D.P., while in other countries this share was
lower. Latvia had the lowest share.
After the 2008 crisis, as mentioned above, the general opinion was to strengthen
the industrial sector. This process, measured as an increase in manufacturing value
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added as a percentage of G.D.P., was successful in almost all countries. The only
exception was Croatia (Table A1 in Appendix). However, the manufacturing value
added as a percentage of G.D.P. in C.E.E.C.s is higher than the E.U. average (16%).
The exceptions are Croatia and Latvia. The high share of industry may be explained
by the fact that in transition countries the deindustrialisation process was shorter
compared with Western economies.
For comparison purposes, the manufacturing sector’s share of gross value added
has decreased in all western European economies since 2005. The exception is
Germany, where this share has remained almost unchanged. Still, there are large dif-
ferences in industry share within these countries in 2015 – Ireland (36.9%) and
Portugal (13.8%) (World Bank Data). Even though the decrease in industry share
may be explained by the stronger growth of the service sector, in some of these coun-
tries this decline can be explained by worsening international competitiveness. This
decline in competitiveness is related to price-related factors and efficiency of institu-
tions, financial, product and labour markets (Heymann & Vetter, 2013).
According to the review of previous literature, it seems that the process of indus-
trialisation is determined by various factors, such as real effective exchange rate
(R.E.E.R.), interest rate, household final consumption (H.F.C.), F.D.I.s and trade
openness. The data for analysing variables of interest for the period 2005–2015 were
obtained from the World Development Indicators (W.D.I.) database published by
World Bank. Variables included in our research are defined and analysed in the fol-
lowing section.
R.E.E.R. is the weighted average of a country’s currency relative to an index or
basket of other major currencies, adjusted for the effects of inflation. For calculating
R.E.E.R. the weights are determined by comparing the relative trade balance of a
country’s currency against each country within the index. This exchange rate is used
to determine an individual country’s currency value relative to the other major cur-
rencies. The trend of the R.E.E.R. in all C.E.E.C.s was positive in the period before
crises. This finding indicates that currencies of the analysed countries have been
Figure 1. Manufacturing value-added average as a percentage of G.D.P. in C.E.E.C.s. Source: World
Bank Data.
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strengthened in that period. However, after the crisis the R.E.E.R. has been relatively
stable in all countries (Table A2 in Appendix).
The real interest rate ratio is calculated as the real interest rate in specific country
divided by average real interest rate in the Economic and Monetary Union (E.M.U.).
The real interest rate is an interest rate that has been adjusted to remove the effects
of inflation to reflect the real cost of funds to the borrower and the real yield to the
lender or to an investor. The real interest rate of an investment is calculated as the
amount by which the nominal interest rate is higher than the inflation rate. In
the period 2005–2015 the real interest rate has significantly varied within and among
the analysed countries. However, according to the real interest rate ratio indicator, it
is evident that this ratio for Croatia and the Slovak Republic was higher than 1 for
almost the whole analysed period (2005–2015).1 This indicates that in Croatia and
the Slovak Republic the credit costs were worse than in the E.M.U. member coun-
tries. In other analysed countries this ratio was declining in the period 2005–2008,
and indicates that credit conditions were improved in comparison to those in the
E.M.U. After the crisis, by 2013 the real interest rate ratio indicator started to rise,
and this trend suggests the inferior position of these countries. However, after 2013
the trend of the real interest rate ratio indicator has been declining, and indicates the
improvement regarding financial conditions in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia (Table A3 in Appendix).
H.F.C. expenditure (formerly private consumption) is the market value of all goods
and services, including durable products (such as cars, washing machines and home
computers), purchased by households. It includes the expenditures of nonprofit insti-
tutions serving households, even when reported separately by the country. Data are
in constant local currency. H.F.C. was relatively stable in all analysed countries for
the observed period.
F.D.I. is the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest
(10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other
long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This
series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) from foreign
investors and is divided by G.D.P. In the observed period, F.D.I. net inflows had a
slightly positive trend before the crisis and negative trend after the crisis. In Hungary,
Bulgaria and Estonia this trend was significant (Table A4 in Appendix).
The analysis of the trade openness indicator, measured as the sum of import (as a
percentage of G.D.P.) and export (as a percentage of G.D.P.), shows that in all
C.E.E.C.s trade openness had a positive trend for the whole observed period, with the
exception in the time of crisis when this indicator sharply decreased (Table A5
in Appendix).
4. Model specification and results
This study investigates a panel of 11 C.E.E.C.s for the period 2005–2015 and com-
prises 121 observations. We included: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Our explained
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variable is the industrialisation in C.E.E.C.s measured as the manufacturing value
added as a percentage of G.D.P. in constant prices (MAN) that is regressed against
these independent variables: REER, real interest rate ratio (INT_R), HFC, FDI and
openness (OPEN). The data were obtained from the W.D.I. database published by the
World Bank.
In order to examine the influence of financial conditions on the process of dein-
dustrialisation, a fixed-effect panel regression model can be employed. Hsiao (2003)
and Klevmarken (1989) list several benefits from using panel models – controlling for
individual heterogeneity, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more
degrees of freedom and more efficiency of the data, the effects that are simply not
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data can be better detected and
measured, etc.
The basic class of models that can be estimated using panel techniques may be
written as (1):
yi;t ¼ aþ X0i;tbþ ui;ti ¼ 1; :::;N; t ¼ 1; :::;T (1)
where i denotes cross-section dimension (in our case countries), t denotes the time-
series dimension (in our case years), a is a scalar (constant term), b is K 1 vector of
coefficients, Xi,t is the i,t-th observation on K explanatory variables, ui,t is error com-
ponent. This error component consists of the time-invariant unobservable individual-
specific effect that is not included in the regression (mi), and the reminder of the dis-
turbance that varies within cross-section and time-series dimension (i,t):
ui;t ¼ li þ i;t (2)
In fixed-effects model mi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated, and
i,t are independent and identically distributed with mean 0, and variance r
2
. The
Xi,t are assumed to be independent of the i,t for all i and t.
Because we are focusing on the specific set of countries (C.E.E.C.s) and our infer-
ence is restricted to this set, according to Baltagi (2008) the fixed-effects model is an
appropriate specification. Using a fixed-effects model, the ‘individuality’ of each coun-
try is taken into account by letting the intercept vary for each country, but it is still
assumed that the slope coefficients are constant across countries. The adequacy of
fixed effect can be tested by employing Cross-section F and Cross-section Chi-square
tests with the null hypothesis that the cross-section effects are redundant.
The fixed-effects model, by the substitution of (2) into (1), can be written as (3):
yi;t ¼ aþ X0i;tbþ li þ i;t (3)
Now, Generalised Method of Moments (G.M.M.) and Instrumental Variable (I.V.)
estimator can be performed on (3) to get estimates of a, b and m. Namely, the
G.M.M./I.V. estimator should be used if the error distribution cannot be considered
independent of the regressors’ distribution. Hansen (1982) proposed to use the
G.M.M. approach in situations when we have heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
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Since then, G.M.M. has become a very popular tool that is used in empirical research.
The standard I.V. estimator is a special case of G.M.M. estimator.
We estimate a model of the form:
MAN ¼ aþ b1REERþ b2INT Rþ b3HFC þ b4FDI þ b5OPEN þ li þ i;t (4)
Table 1 contains the results of our model and the results of tests. All statistical
tests confirm the statistical validity of the proposed model.
The results of the model indicate that REER, INT_R and OPEN are statistically sig-
nificant variables, while HFC, FDI are not. The sign of REER is negative, and that
means that appreciation of domestic currency will have negative effect on manufac-
turing production. This is in line with Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006), who argued
that favourable exchange rates help export sectors, like manufacturing, to compete.
This sector is a tradable sector, and in this case exchange rate undervaluation can act
like a subsidy (Aizenman and Lee, 2010, Benigno et al., 2015, McLeod and Mileva,
2011). Furthermore, our research results suggest that the negative impact of decreased
foreign competitiveness due to stronger domestic currency is higher than the gains
that manufacturing industry receives due to lower prices of imported raw materials.
As expected, INT_R has negative sign. This is in line with the analysis of the
European Commission (2009a; 2009b) that was conducted on the sample of 25 E.U.
countries, and which shows that real interest rates have a robust negative correlation
with manufacturing output growth. According to our finding, the higher real interest
rate in a specific C.E.E.C. compared with the interest rate in the E.M.U. will nega-
tively influence the manufacturing production in that country. This finding is also in
accordance with La Roux and Ismail (2004).
The variable OPEN is significant and has a positive sign. This indicates that indus-
trial production is international trade oriented through exporting final products and
importing the raw materials. This supports the findings of Jamison et al. (2003),
whose paper shows that trade openness has a strong impact on economic growth,
and Rodrik’s (1998) conclusions of positive relationship between openness and output
of the economy. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991) explained connections by
the flow of knowledge and new technologies.
We also included FDI in our model because some papers suggest that there may be
some connections between manufacturing production and this variable. We did not
find this connection in our sample of C.E.E.C.s, and this could be explained by the fact
that most of the F.D.I.s were directed to the service sector rather than manufacturing.
Furthermore, we included the HFC variable in our model in order to find out
whether H.F.C. is important for manufacturing production. We find that it does not
directly influence MAN, but because of endogeneity of this variable (negative relation
between HFC and INT_R) we used it with lags as excluded instruments which
improve our model characteristics.
5. Concluding remarks
For a long time, deindustrialisation was considered as a prerequisite for successful economic
development. However, after the crisis of 2008, this opinion has changed, and a much
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greater appreciation of the importance of industry has become evident. Increasing numbers
of economists and policymakers consider that reindustrialisation is a key factor for enhanc-
ing economic growth and a better living standard in the post-crisis Europe. A new indus-
trial policy in the E.U. focuses on increasing manufacturing share in G.D.P. This is
particularly important for new E.U. member states from C.E.E.C.s. In these countries the
deindustrialisation process has caused reallocation of resources and employment from the
industrial sector to the service sector. Due to this reallocation, the level of industrial produc-
tion in several C.E.E.C. economies is at a lower level than before the transition.
In this paper we examine the role of the financial conditions for industrialisation
level in C.E.E.C.s in the period 2005–2015. To the best of our knowledge, this issue
has not been addressed in the existing empirical literature. The analysis of the results
in this research suggests that real interest rate ratio, R.E.E.R. and trade openness are
very important for the level of industrialisation. Even though the deindustrialisation
process resulted in decreased manufacturing share in G.D.P. in all C.E.E.C.s, this
share is still above the E.U. average. This finding implies that policy makers in
C.E.E.C.s should provide additional incentives in order to stimulate modernisation
and reindustrialisation of the E.U.’s industry through highly adaptive, productive and
technologically advanced industries. Furthermore, the results highlight the necessity
of expanding the analysis of this issue and of conducting additional study of
micro-level data to verify these findings. Also, it could be very useful to analyse the
Table 1. Model and diagnostics.
Dependent variable: MAN
Variable Coefficient Standard error P 95% confidence interval
REER .0924458 .0419519 0.028 .1746699 .0102216
INT_R .3511807 .1564406 0.025 .6577987 .0445627
HFC 1.41e-12 9.28e-13 0.130 4.13e-13 3.22e-12
FDI .0031343 .0242018 0.897 .050569 .0443004
OPEN .0316726 .028499 0.014 .0064873 .0568579
Instrumented: HFC
Included instruments: REER INT_R FDI HFC OPEN
Excluded instruments: L.HFC L2.HFC L3.HFC L4.HFC L5.HFC
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 4.078
Chi-sq(3) P-value ¼0.5382
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 35.124
Chi-sq(4) P-value ¼ 0.0000
Weak identification test (Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic) 52.348
Stock–Yogo weak ID test critical values: 5% maximal I.V. relative bias 16.85
10% maximal I.V. relative bias 10.27
20% maximal I.V. relative bias 6.71
30% maximal I.V. relative bias 5.34
10% maximal I.V. size 24.58
15% maximal I.V. size 13.96
20% maximal I.V. size 10.26
25% maximal I.V. size 8.31
Source: Stock–Yogo (2005). Reproduced with permission.
Number of obs¼ 47 F( 5, 34)¼ 5.73
Prob > F¼ 0.0006
Total (centred) SS ¼29.22445601 Centred R2 ¼ 0.5637
Total (uncentred) SS ¼29.22445601 Uncentred R2 ¼ 0.5637
Residual SS ¼12.7061164 Root MSE ¼ .5718
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank Data.
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composition of industry in each country in order to determine its influence on the
relationship between industrialisation and financial conditions.
Note
1. If the indicator is greater than 1 that means that the real interest rate in specific country
is higher than the average real interest rate in EMU.
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Appendix
Table A1. Manufacturing value added as a percentage of G.D.P. in C.E.E.C.s.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 15.83 15.78 16.29 14.53 14.72 13.47 15.68 15.79 14.68 15.19 15.51
Croatia 15.63 15.21 15.18 15.08 14.44 14.16 14.39 14.48 14.12 14.48 14.70
Czech Republic 25.50 25.93 25.96 24.53 22.87 23.45 24.44 24.73 24.83 26.76 26.97
Hungary 16.64 16.47 15.93 15.48 14.13 15.69 16.57 15.91 15.54 16.15 15.84
Latvia 22.01 22.66 22.21 21.38 20.26 21.63 22.03 22.32 22.49 23.32 24.59
Poland 12.97 12.07 11.40 10.77 10.89 13.44 13.22 13.12 12.65 12.26 12.30
Romania 20.16 19.47 17.70 17.49 16.73 18.77 20.37 20.67 19.42 19.20 19.34
Slovak Republic 18.35 18.79 18.92 18.65 18.50 17.68 18.10 18.44 17.91 18.92 19.87
Source: World Bank Data.
Table A2. Real effective exchange rate in C.E.E.C.s.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 82.59 86.27 91.28 99.76 104.06 100.00 102.71 100.72 101.98 101.43 98.20
Croatia 94.37 96.33 97.03 101.46 102.64 100.00 97.90 96.07 97.41 96.34 93.45
Czech Republic 81.66 86.19 88.86 102.57 98.40 100.00 102.16 99.09 97.13 91.37 89.91
Hungary 94.23 89.92 100.25 103.86 97.84 100.00 100.02 97.73 96.63 92.27 89.08
Latvia 82.24 84.76 91.53 101.43 107.09 100.00 102.01 98.78 98.75 100.24 99.05
Poland 95.46 97.48 100.98 110.71 94.06 100.00 98.55 96.01 96.68 97.35 94.02
Romania 96.05 103.05 111.65 106.09 98.07 100.00 102.85 96.67 101.23 101.48 97.74
Slovak Republic 75.62 80.15 88.88 97.25 103.73 100.00 101.18 100.72 102.16 101.94 98.53
Source: World Bank Data.
Table A3. Real interest rate ratio in C.E.E.C.s.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 0.64 0.53 0.24 0.50 1.28 1.53 0.87 1.57 1.72 1.10 0.89
Croatia 2.37 1.52 1.23 0.82 1.55 1.73 1.57 1.52 1.46 0.79 1.18
Czech Republic 1.78 1.28 0.54 0.82 0.59 1.36 1.13 0.76 0.61 0.30 0.56
Hungary 0.34 0.94 1.11 0.20 1.62 1.08 0.16 0.49 0.25 0.42 0.59
Latvia 1.89 1.18 0.87 0.98 1.24 0.94 1.19 1.06 0.57 0.15 0.20
Poland 1.43 1.21 1.89 0.01 5.24 1.94 0.00 0.35 0.77 2.69 3.40
Romania 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.23 2.20 0.65
Slovak Republic 1.31 0.98 1.50 1.42 1.39 1.88 1.70 2.28 1.61 0.93 0.62
Source: World Bank Data.
Table A4. Foreign direct investment in C.E.E.C.s.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 13.74 22.95 31.00 18.84 7.52 3.64 3.66 3.32 3.57 3.64 5.53
Croatia 3.95 6.54 7.60 7.36 5.10 2.39 2.28 2.59 1.62 6.94 0.33
Czech Republic 10.10 4.59 7.32 3.75 2.56 4.91 1.84 4.55 3.51 3.89 0.92
Hungary 22.33 13.04 15.42 7.74 9.49 13.30 4.83 7.76 4.30 6.42 2.90
Latvia 7.55 16.27 50.74 47.69 2.28 16.07 7.50 8.34 2.80 9.30 4.36
Poland 4.79 7.95 8.78 4.02 0.12 1.83 5.32 3.84 3.27 3.46 2.82
Romania 3.24 6.84 5.77 3.99 0.05 2.33 3.54 1.34 1.52 1.04 2.34
Slovak Republic 3.61 6.23 5.83 2.73 3.19 3.84 3.50 1.47 0.15 3.63 2.95
Source: World Bank Data.
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Table A5. Trade openness in C.E.E.C.s.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 111.29 122.61 124.27 93.12 103.21 117.76 124.78 129.71 130.97 128.07 111.29
Croatia 86.07 85.27 84.99 72.76 75.90 81.27 82.68 85.60 90.85 97.20 86.07
Czech Republic 127.84 130.66 124.56 113.74 129.25 138.78 147.54 147.98 158.73 159.78 127.84
Hungary 137.12 135.27 137.52 116.65 143.80 167.35 170.43 167.00 162.59 154.42 137.12
Latvia 149.69 155.93 158.92 145.48 159.16 168.21 166.82 165.00 170.37 172.54 149.69
Poland 100.62 95.92 92.00 86.83 108.79 120.61 127.07 123.81 120.96 118.99 100.62
Romania 121.50 113.84 125.85 105.56 132.56 152.54 162.39 166.67 159.87 152.38 121.50
Slovak Republic 77.79 80.66 80.75 75.23 82.11 87.08 89.33 90.69 93.74 95.95 77.79
Source: World Bank Data.
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